Robert McNamara: "It's Just Wrong What We're Doing"
compiled by Michael R. Burch
The following are excerpts from an exclusive interview by Doug Saunders with former U.S.
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, a primary architect of the Vietnam War,
who chose to break his silence on Iraq: The United States, he says, is making
the same mistakes all over again.
"We were wrong, terribly wrong. We owe it to future generations to explain
With those words, written nine years ago, Robert McNamara began an
extraordinary final phase of his career—devoted to chronicling the errors,
delusions and false assumptions that turned him into the chief architect and
most prominent promoter of the Vietnam war.
No historic figure has put so much effort into self-examination: At the age
of 87, he has now written three very detailed and analytical books, and starred
in one very good movie, devoted to the fundamental mistakes that led the United
States into the most politically costly and least successful war in its history.
What, then, does he think about Iraq? Until now, the former secretary of
defense has avoided comment on the actions of that job's current occupant,
Donald Rumsfeld. The two are often compared to each other in their autocratic
leadership styles and in their technocratic, numbers-driven approaches to war.
And their wars, of course, are often likened. But Robert McNamara has insisted
in staying out of the fray.
He decided to break his silence on Iraq when I called him up the other day at
his Washington office. I told him that his carefully enumerated lists of
historic lessons from Vietnam were in danger of being ignored. He agreed, and
told me that he was deeply frustrated to see history repeating itself.
"We're misusing our influence," he said in a staccato voice that had lost
none of its rapid-fire engagement. "It's just wrong what we're doing. It's
morally wrong, it's politically wrong, it's economically wrong."
McNamara's eleven lessons:
In 1995, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara published In
Retrospect, the first of his three books dissecting the errors, myths and
miscalculations that led to the Vietnam War, which he now believes was a serious
mistake. Nine years later, most of these lessons seem uncannily relevant to the
Iraq war in its current nation-building, guerrilla-warfare phase.
(1) We misjudged then—and we have since—the geopolitical intentions of
our adversaries ... and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of their
(2) We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our own
experience ... We totally misjudged the political forces within the country.
(3) We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people to fight
and die for their beliefs and values.
(4) Our judgments of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of
the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area, and the
personalities and habits of their leaders.
(5) We failed then—and have since—to recognize the limitations of
modern, high-technology military equipment, forces and doctrine ... We failed as
well to adapt our military tactics to the task of winning the hearts and minds
of people from a totally different culture.
(6) We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank
discussion and debate of the pros and cons of a large-scale military involvement
... before we initiated the action.
(7) After the action got under way and unanticipated events forced us off our
planned course ... we did not fully explain what was happening and why we were
doing what we did.
(8) We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are
omniscient. Our judgment of what is in another people's or country's best
interest should be put to the test of open discussion in international forums.
We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our image or as we
(9) We did not hold to the principle that U.S. military action ... should be
carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces supported fully (and
not merely cosmetically) by the international community.
(10) We failed to recognize that in international affairs, as in other
aspects of life, there may be problems for which there are no immediate
solutions ... At times, we may have to live with an imperfect, untidy world.
(11) Underlying many of these errors lay our failure to organize the top
echelons of the executive branch to deal effectively with the extraordinarily
complex range of political and military issues.
While he did not want to talk on the record about specific military decisions
made Mr. Rumsfeld, he said the United States is fighting a war that he believes
is totally unnecessary and has managed to destroy important relationships with
potential allies. "There have been times in the last year when I was just
utterly disgusted by our position, the United States' position vis-à-vis the
other nations of the world."
On Monday night, we heard the United States at its very worst with George W.
Bush's caustic State of the Union address, in which he declared, over and over,
that America is serving God's will directly and does not need "a permission
slip" from other nations since "the cause we serve is right, because it is the
cause of all mankind."
That vision of manifest destiny, stripped of any larger view, has led down
some unfortunate roads. The Iraq action, which would have been conducted in some
form or another at some point under any imaginable government, would have been
far better conceived if its executors had read Mr. McNamara's works instead of
the Book of Revelation.
... to read Mr. McNamara's 1995 list today is to read an uncanny analysis of
the missteps of the Iraq campaign. He told me that this list has come to haunt
him as he watches the Mesopotamian misadventure unfold.
Chief among the discoveries that led him to see Vietnam as a mistake, he
said, was his realization that the United States could not, by itself, properly
analyze the actions and ground-level conditions necessary to achieve the complex
and ambiguous goals of a war—reversing the influence of communism in Asia, in
Vietnam's case, or bringing democracy to the Arab world, in Iraq's.
"And the reason I feel that is that we're not omniscient," he said. "And
we've demonstrated that in Iraq, I think." He pointed to Washington's failure to
appreciate the complexities of Iraqi culture, and therefore to anticipate the
extended guerrilla war it is now engaged in—a chief mistake of Vietnam.
Without the full involvement of other major nations, he said, such mistakes will
always be made.
"And if we can't persuade other nations with comparable values and comparable
interests of the merit of our course, we should reconsider the course, and very
likely change it. And if we'd followed that rule, we wouldn't have been in
Vietnam, because there wasn't one single major ally, not France or Britain or
Germany or Japan, that agreed with our course or stood beside us there. And we
wouldn't be in Iraq."
"... I do not believe, with one qualification, that it should ever, ever use
that power unilaterally—the one qualification being the unlikely event we had
to use it to defend the continental U.S., Alaska or Hawaii."
Mr. McNamara said it is particularly upsetting to see that the White House
administration has ignored or failed to heed key recommendations coming from
military officers on the ground in Iraq—a crucial and oft-repeated mistake in
... he suggests repeatedly that his faith in superior military technology and
the scientific potential of data processing (he was known to his 1960s critics
as "an IBM machine with legs") led him to underestimate the difficulties and
complexities of the cultures in which he was fighting.
The same fundamental fallacy, he said, is present today. Even though
computerized and laser-guided weapons allow campaigns to be waged with only a
few dozen American deaths and hundreds of foreign deaths (as opposed to the tens
of thousands of American deaths and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese deaths
in the 1960s and 1970s), it has become no easier to achieve society-transforming
military goals, or to extricate yourself from an invaded nation.
He said many lives have been unnecessarily lost around the world because the
United States has refused to support the International Criminal Court, an
institution he believes could have provided an alternative to war in Iraq.
"Let's think about that in human terms—you have to reduce the risk of
killing and catastrophe," he said. "We've got to do that, and we're not paying
nearly enough attention to it. And one illustration is, we don't support things
that would have that as their goal ... for example, this international court.
The U.S. is totally opposed to it. I think they're absolutely wrong. We've not
only refused to support it, we try to buy off countries that are supporting it."